BlackOps Adversary Register Who takes money off buyers, and what actually stops them No ads, no affiliates
Register › What stops them

BlackOps addresses

Three published addresses for the same market. Copy rather than retype, and verify the signature once you are through.

Mirror 1 blackops5l63qnwnmlnsfvtlu66md3x3vp3fdtpna42eq7ozujr67hid.onion
Mirror 2 blackops6kignp3eddmvqcfkjzf6qr6haxbmkypc2xtqlnhuu4ak4dqd.onion
Mirror 3 blackops27m32abqvbhnyswgazqawxqbznbzkkkv5sjo7gve2ndpsdad.onion

This site publishes the list and does not monitor it. An address that opens is not an address that is genuine, and the check that settles it takes under a minute.

What stops them

Six habits. Not fourteen defences for fourteen adversaries, which is the practical payoff of sorting the register this way.

Coverage

Which habit stops which adversary. Most are covered more than once, which is why missing one is survivable and missing the first is not.

HabitCovers
Verify on arrivalClone operator, recycled address, outage opportunist, long con account, directory buyer, gateway lookalikes
Pin a fingerprint onceEverything above, plus the key rotation forger. Nothing else works without this.
Read the middleRecycled address, clone operator. And the ends, which catches the clipboard swapper.
Unique credentialsCredential stuffer completely, account buyer partly
No parked balanceExiting vendor, and every loss that has nothing to do with an attacker
Refuse to hurryOutage opportunist, fake support, key rotation forger, off escrow persuader
The one gapNothing on this page stops the clipboard swapper, because that adversary is already on your machine and verification assumes a machine you can trust. That is a real gap and it is better stated than papered over.

The six