BlackOps Adversary Register Who takes money off buyers, and what actually stops them No ads, no affiliates
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BlackOps addresses

Three published addresses for the same market. Copy rather than retype, and verify the signature once you are through.

Mirror 1 blackops5l63qnwnmlnsfvtlu66md3x3vp3fdtpna42eq7ozujr67hid.onion
Mirror 2 blackops6kignp3eddmvqcfkjzf6qr6haxbmkypc2xtqlnhuu4ak4dqd.onion
Mirror 3 blackops27m32abqvbhnyswgazqawxqbznbzkkkv5sjo7gve2ndpsdad.onion

This site publishes the list and does not monitor it. An address that opens is not an address that is genuine, and the check that settles it takes under a minute.

The flooder

Takes nothing from you directly. Creates the conditions the rest of the register depends on.

What they want
The real addresses to be slow or unreachable. What happens next is somebody else's business, and often the same person's.
How they earn
Indirectly. An unreachable market produces anxious people looking for a way in, which is the window the outage opportunist works.
What it costs them
Less than it should. Reaching a hidden service is expensive for the client by design, and that symmetry means forcing the service to do the work is cheap.
How you meet them
As slowness. Timeouts, hangs, pages that partly render, and a checking screen that never finishes.
What gives them away
Nothing, and it does not matter. From your side flooding and ordinary congestion are the same thing and call for the same response.
What stops them
Nothing you can do. What you control is not making it worse and not going looking for an address while it lasts.

Why hidden services are easy to flood

A service cannot see who is connecting. No source address, no geography, no reputation, so the entire toolkit an ordinary site uses to shed junk traffic is unavailable. There is also no equivalent of sitting something in front to absorb it, because the whole architecture exists to ensure nothing sits in front. Defence has to happen at the service itself, in the same place doing the real work.

What remains is limiting behaviour rather than identity, which is why rate limiting exists and why it feels arbitrary. It is the only tool available, and without it one person with a script could make an address unusable for everybody.

What it looks like from your side

What you seeWhat to do
One address slow, others fineSwitch. Flooding is aimed at addresses, and the newest is often the one they have not scraped yet.
All slow, other onion services fineSomething shared. Wait.
All slow, other onions also badNetwork conditions. Nothing address specific helps.
Fast then progressively slowerYou are hitting a limiter. Stop reloading.
Hangs with no errorA dead circuit. Build a new one rather than waiting.
The self inflicted partReloading under congestion is the most common way people make their own situation worse. Every reload adds load and pushes you toward the limiter that turns slow into refused.

The thing worth remembering

Slowness is boring and self resolving. It becomes dangerous only when it makes you impatient enough to accept an address from somebody, which is precisely the sequence this profile exists to create. Waiting is not passive here, it is the countermeasure.